The control room must be protected
Somewhere out West there is a certain ICBM missile site. There are two Air Force officers on watch. They have the firing-release keys and other necessary stuff for firing the missiles. Their control room is designed for autonomous operation. If they wish, they can launch a missile any time. The reason no watch crew has ever done so is because the Air Force is hyper-careful about screening the officers assigned to the control room. Also, the firing console is designed so that one person cannot operate all the controls needed to fire. You must have two operators, and the chance that both officers would go bonkers at the same and launch a missile is nil.

Now, let's embark upon a little thought experiment. Now, using whatever scenario you wish, imagine that al four Qaeda terrorists managed to get into the site. They elude security or kill the guards. They make their way to the control room, only to discover it is reinforced against forced entry. No problem, they knew it would be. Some plastic explosives gains entry. Once inside, they easily kill the watch officers, who are unarmed. Having trained extensively for this mission, the al Qaeda terrorists launch a missile.

Now, you ask, why were the watch officers not armed? Of all the areas of the site that absolutely had to be protected, the control room is it. No matter how much of the rest of the site the terrorists control, if they can't take over the control room, they cannot succeed. If only the two watch officers had been armed with even an automatic pistol each, they could have killed the terrorists at the door.

Now, just substitute "airliner" for 'missile site," and "cockpit" for "control room and "pilots" for "watch officers." I am hoping that this makes it clear why the option of pilots armed with pistols is essential for future security: If the terrorists cannot take over the cockpit, they fail.

Reinforced cockpit doors can be breached. Malleable but powerful explosives can be transported aboard in a way that security measures would not halt. The KGB and CIA have had deadly weapons disguised as ordinary objects for decades; their design and technology is no secret. If they really want to take over the cabin, they can. And if they want to breach the cockpit door, they will. If the door is their final barrier, they win.

But the door, on which Norman Mineta et. al. place so much confidence, is beside the point. The cockpit is the point. The cockpit must be controlled. Unarmed pilots lose every time. Armed pilots have a good chance of winning. Next time you fly, see how big the cockpit door is when you board. One at a time through the door, that's it. Easy target for the pilot or copilot. The terrorists can't use much violence in overcoming armed pilots because they need the cockpit intact to fly the plane as a kamikaze weapon. The terrorists are at a severe disadvantage in overcoming armed pilots.

Pilots know that only the cockpit really matters. One airline pilot I knew told me years ago that he never felt any stress of responsibility in flying dozens and dozens of people around at a time. "I just figure my job is to get the cockpit safely to the gate," he said, "and the rest will follow fine." I do not believe that the murder of passengers or crew can any longer convince pilots to open the cockpit door. It would be literally suicidal to do so.

The object of arming pilots is not to ensure gun battles in the wild blue. It is to make airline hiijacking's odds of success so low that terrorists find it too low to attempt. Consider what terrorists would have to consider:

Once we start the hijacking, we will have to overcome cabin crew who may have a TASER, but that's no problem; we'll temporarily lose one terrorist. Then we'll have to kill lots of the passengers because they will not be passive. We may lose one or two men to the passengers, but not probably not lethally because the passengers are unarmed. But in the near term, we will lose, temporarily, half our number. All the while, the pilots are making emergency speed to the nearest airport to land. So we have to take over the cockpit right away. The problem is that the pilots have .357 magnums and only one of us can get through the door at a time. And we won't have guns ourselves because we can't count on getting guns into the plane. We can smuggle explosives aboard, but only for the cockpit door; we sure can't blow up the cockpit! So the chance of success is to low to make it worth the effort.

That's my last word on the topic. Congress needs to pass the legislation with three crucial provisions:

No power of the executive branch to specify when and if pilots may be armed,

No power of airlines to do the same thing (they'll forbid it),

No screening of pilots other than a criminal background check. Airline pilots have already been screened psychologically and medically.

Finally, see George Wills'excellent piece on this topic which offers other justifications for arming pilots.