Why aren't India and Pakistan already fighting?

Today's news reports say that at least one million troops are massed by India and Pakistan along the disputed lines of control in Kashmir and adjacent areas. There have been cross-border artillery fires in recent weeks that have killed Indian civilians - this month there was an attack on an Indian base that left 34 dead, mostly women and children . So why aren't the two nations at war already?

The history of the subcontinent is not one of calm deliberation over such provocations as each side accuses the other. I think there are some new wrinkles that are staying the hand on both sides.

Unquestionably, the number one deterrent to open warfare is that both countries are nuclear powers. Both nations realize full well that nothing gained from war can possibly outweigh the destruction that a nuclear exhange would yield. Who owns Kashmir is inconsequential compared with the prospect of losing hundreds of thousands or even millions of citizens, and both sides know it.

Pakistanis are pretty clearly the overall aggressor, but that does not mean the Pakistani government is. The Musharraf government makes the same territorial claims that its predecessors did, but Musharraf is not controlling the cross-border terrorism by Pakistani or Pakistani-sponsored terrorists. (This morning the British government, though, gave India a diplomatic victory by stating, from the mouth of British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw,

"President Musharraf has already had enough time [to contain cross-border terrorism]. It is vital he recognizes the urgency of the situation," Straw explained. Straw appeared to dismiss assertions made by Musharraf in a televised speech on Monday that infiltration across the border into Indian Kashmir had stopped. "The test is by action and not words. The international community looks to Musharraf for full implementation of the promises made by him," he said. . . . Straw said that he would "reiterate that the United Kingdom stands with all civilized governments, particularly India".

India probably realizes that Musharraf may be driven from office by war, and his successor, whomever it might be, would be more inimical to India, not less.

The presence of tens of thousands of American citizens in the region, plus the presence of powerful American military forces, may well be staying the hand from the trigger.

The Indian government realizes that a nuclear exchange, even if limited, would probably lead to its fall.
The problem is that non-governmental militaries, that is, terrorists, are numerous, devoted, and well armed. They also enjoy significant support from many sectors of the population and from some military agencies. It will be an iron task for Musharraf to clamp down on them, for they will fight back violently. Actually, they already have fought back:

[In] early 2001, the Pakistani Interior Ministry issued instructions for all religious militant groups fighting in Indian Kashmir to close their offices in Pakistan. The backlash was swift and fierce. There was strong resistance within the senior echelons of the military leadership, as well as in the powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), at that time headed by Lieutenant-General Ahmed Mehmood. The move was brought to an abrupt halt the very next day, and a smear campaign was begun against the interior minister. However, he refused to admit defeat and publicly warned that the militant groups would have to change their behavior or one day face the music.

The post-Taliban era has helped [Pakistani Minister of the Interior Moinuddin] Haider realize his warning to the militants and to push forward with an aggressive agenda to establish a civil society, even though his brother, Ehetesham, was shot dead in Karachi. [citation]

The situation is indeed serious. But overall, I think that the threat of civil war within Pakistan, or at least much escalated guerrilla war, is actually more serious than war between India and Pakistan. If that comes to pass, India may contemplate intervening in some way to preserve the Musharraf regime rather than risk control of Pakistan's nukes by Islamic radicals.