Bush has not made a case for war against Iraq
Joe Katzman on Winds of Change has been wondering lately whether the US actually intends to confront Iraq militarily. John Deryshire on NRO says the answer is definitely not. This morning Joe cites a Times (UK) story that attempts to explain President Bush's coalition-building strategy among the Europeans.

The US media have seemed certain that the US intends to confront Iraq militarily and decisively. Various media have said the Second Iraq War will begin anytime from late summer 2002 to the spring of 2003. I personally think it will be later rather than sooner. I also don't think that going to war again with Iraq is a certainty. It may not occur, although it definitely seems much more probable than not.

I do not think that President Bush has yet made a case for another war against Iraq.

Do you remember all the rumor mongering in the media and government circles about supposed meetings between head 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta and an Iraqi intelligence operative in Prague? Now it turns out that the meetings never happened. (I first wrote about the unlikelihood of collusion between Iraq and al Qaeda only a week after the attacks, though not on a blog site.)

While there could be a tie between 9/11 and Saddam's regime, I don't think there is. The violence by bin Laden and his allies against America is not principally a clash between political systems. It is a clash of incompatible world views and irreconcilable ways of understanding the nature of reality itself, springing from extreme Islamic fundamentalism. Saddam and bin Laden, despite their mutual hatred for America, have probably not found common cause, so far, anyway. Iraq, despite Saddam's depravity, is culturally maybe the most highly westernized Arab country. In fact, bin Laden has criticized Saddam Hussein's regime for not being truly Islamic. Bin Laden's fundamentalism doesn't fit comfortably in Iraqi culture. This culture became acquainted with western thought long before the rest of the Arab world and has become deeply embedded with scientific epistemology. Yet al Qaeda has not targeted Iraq, probably because they know that Saddam would be merciless in taking vengeance, and al Qaeda may yet hold out hope that they can use Saddam for their own purposes.

So the question the present Bush administration needs to answer before any action against Iraq is this: What is the present justification for a military campaign against Iraq?

I grant, of course, that Saddam is a bloodthirsty, unstable tyrant whose crimes can hardly be enumerated. But this was true before 9/11. And complicity by Saddam in the attacks of 9/11 seems remote now. So what changed between 9/11 and Jan. 29, when President Bush named Iraq as a nation of the Axis of Evil?

Remember that during his State of the Union speech, Bush did not tie Saddam to 9/11. As the BBC recalls, Bush then summarized his case against Saddam in only one paragraph, with four main issues:

Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror.

The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade.

This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens, leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children.

This is a regime that agreed to international inspections, then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilised world.

All these things are true, but they have been true for many years. It seems the administration is just taking for granted that the American people somehow intuitively know that Saddam is bad enough to plunge America into a conventional war - a Gulf War replay, although one hopefully with a truly decisive American victory. It is true that polls since 9/11 have shown a very large majority of Americans say they support such action.

But I still say that President Bush has not made the case for war against Iraq. Before the US takes any action, Bush should -

explain fully to the American people what the reasons for war are, and

seek an actual declaration of war against Iraq by the Congress, not just an "authorization."

The campaign in Afghanistan does not offer a model for a campaign against Iraq. The Northern Alliance was an intact political and military opposition to the Taliban regime. But no such thing exists in Iraq to oppose Saddam. The Iraqi National Conference has no military capability to speak of. The northern Kurds just want to separate from Iraq, not take it over. If Saddam is to relinquish power from non-natural causes, it will have to be by revolution within or invasion from without.

Revolution within is extremely unlikely. Saddam has a true iron grip on the security apparatus, and the key positions are held either by blood relatives or tribal members. Furthermore, he killed the likely revolutionists long ago. The men in potential revolutionary-leadership positions are time servers and bootlickers who got there not from talent, but from a reputation for political reliability. They're sheep, not wolves.

That leaves invasion from without as the only other recourse. Despite the fact of Saddam's evil, President Bush must make a case for war. He hasn't done so.

Footnote:

The fact that the administration is not making a case now buttresses my belief that military action won't take place until next year. There is considerable preparation of both military personnel and materiel needed before the US can mount a campaign of 100,000 - 250,000 troops in Iraq.

Also, there are existing UN conditions for unfettered inspections of Iraqi military and military-related facilities. These UN demands go back to the end of the Gulf War. Needless to say, they are not being done. I think the Bush administration will follow a strategy basically like this:

Tell NATO and the the other countries of Arabysmalia that the USA needs to further justification for decisive war against Iraq, is capable of conducting the war entirely on its own if need be, and is ready to start any time.

But will hold off military action and join in demanding Iraq submit to the full inspection regime without delay if and only if the other nations agree that if Iraq fails to comply, a casus belli for decisive American military actions exists with no further debate.

When Saddam does not comply, use their non-compliance as the centerpiece of the casus belli both domestically and internationally.