In war, is it good for the enemy to be "bloodlessly beaten"? After reading about civilian casualties in Germany in World War II,
Glenn Reynolds wonders:
I'm all for minimizing civilian casualties to the extent possible, consistent with winning the war. But if people are beaten so bloodlessly that they don't feel beaten, and have no real reason to dread a confrontation with the United States, is this really a good thing?
Of course, the reason so many Germans died was that precision-guided munitions did not exist. There's no question that if they had existed, Allied commanders would have used them. However, inflicting mass casualties on our enemies' populations became a stated aim of the governments of Britain and America.
The primary advantage of PGMs is actually hitting the target. During World War II, when there were no PGMs, the allied air forces sent up to 1,000 heavy bombers over German targets at a time. Yet the number of bombs that actually had militarily significant target effects was small in comparison to the number dropped. The British knew this would be the case from the beginning, and didn't even try to hit their targets except by using the law of averages. "Area bombing" was their tactic. They hoped that if they dropped as many bombs as they could, enough would happen to hit the target to make the mission worthwhile.
American commanders believed that intentionally accurate bombing was possible; they even misnamed their technique "precision" bombing. Yet long before the end of the war, American bomb wings were really conducting area bombing tactics; they just continued to pretend they were conducting "precision" bombing. In all, according to the US Strategic Bombing Survey completed after the war, "2,700,000 tons of bombs were dropped [on Germany], more than 1,440,000 bomber sorties" were flown. Yet the Survey reports that "only about 20% of the bombs aimed at precision targets fell within [the] target area."
The destruction achieved was enormous. Almost 60 years later we can scarcely comprehend what the Germans and Japanese endured. In Germany, says the survey, "3,600,000 dwelling units, approximately 20% of the total, were destroyed or heavily damaged. Survey estimates show some 300,000 civilians killed and 780,000 wounded. The number made homeless aggregates 7,500,000. The principal German cities have been largely reduced to hollow walls and piles of rubble."
Most of this destruction was what we now term, "collateral damage." With an average of 80 percent of the bombs falling outside the target area, it was inevitable that non-target areas would suffer heavy damage. The British intended from the beginning to inflict massive destruction on civilian populations and facilities. Partly, this desire was revenge based, since the German Luftwaffe had terror-bombed England. But it was mostly based on the mistaken notion that heavy bombing of civilian centers would reduce civilian morale to the point where they would not support the war any longer. (Why the British thought that German morale was more frail than their own is an unanswered question.)
The Americans rejected terror bombing, but not for long. As the war went on and on, and German and Japanese resistance failed to slacken, President Roosevelt decided that the German and Japanese peoples must realize after the war that not only had their armed forces been defeated: the entire nation, as a nation, had been beaten. He and Churchill were well aware that German militarism had survived World War I because its apologists had successfully propagated the myth that the Kaiser's army had not really been defeated, it had been "stabbed in the back" by disloyal factions at home. Hence, said, Roosevelt,
It is of utmost importance that every person in Germany should realize that this time Germany is a defeated nation. . . . The fact that they are a defeated nation, collectively and individually, must be so impressed upon them that they will hesitate to start any new war.
(Roosevelt's policy seems not far from Civil War Gen. William T. Sherman's observation of the Confederate States, "War, and war alone, can inspire our enemy with respect, and they will have their belly full of that very soon.")
So, according to historian Richard B. Frank in his award-winning book,
Downfall, the End of the Imperial Japanese Empire:
Viewed in this light, massive urban bombing complemented the aim of unconditional surrender. It was not just a handful of vile men who flaunted vile ideologies; whole populations imbibed these beliefs and acted as willing acolytes. Unconditional surrender and vast physical destruction would sear the price of aggression into the minds of the German and Japanese peoples. No soil would be left from which myths might later sprout that Germany and Japan had not really been defeated. These policies would assure that there would be no third world war with Germany, nor would Japan get a second opportunity.
One notes that Japan and Germany have been well behaved since 1945. But we also have to note that massive, destructive bombing was alone not the reason. It was simply impossible for either country's armed forces to claim that they had prevailed, or at least held their own, on the field of battle. German and Japanese orphans, widows and grieving parents were in almost every other household, and a lie that their armed forces had not really lost could not possibly have found legs to stand on.
Most importantly, US forces occupied both countries for several years after the war. In Germany, the division of the country into free and communist states imbued it and Europe with a forced stability that they might not otherwise had. This gave time for democratic institutions to take serious root, and today German democracy is as strong as any in the world. It helped that Germany had no ages-long tradition of centralized authority in monarchs; it had been unified into a single nation only a few decades before.
But in Japan, the situation was quite different. Militarism was deeply rooted; in fact, the entire culture of the country was oriented on producing warriors. The imperial throne had been intact for 2,400 years, although its present polity dated only to the 1860s. Women were politically and socially powerless. And in 1945, its army, navy and air forces virtually eliminated, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur arrived as the first successful invader ever to set foot on the soil of Japan.
In Japan, MacArthur eliminated Japanese militarism first by emplacing a democratically-based constitution and second by liberating Japanese women from centuries of patriarchal oppression. He gave women the rights to vote and to serve in democratic assemblies and government offices, steps MacArthur saw as essential to ending Japanese military aggressiveness. America also bore the brunt of rebuilding Japan's economy and infrastructure. The result: today Japan may fairly be characterized as a Western country. It bears all the hallmarks of Western culture ands tradition: a capitalist economic system, a representative parliament, a toothless monarchy, a vibrant university system and the rule of law.
A comparison to America's present enemies is therefore apt. What made Japan's transition from a medieval culture to a modern one so successful so quickly was the fact that the Japanese people, from top to bottom, realized that the way they had been doing things, in every arena of their society, was no longer tenable and had to be abandoned. This realization was profound and wrenching, but it had been brought about through great violence and enormous cost to their nation.
I have noted before that there is no inherent contradiction between the religion of Islam and democratic institutions. On the contrary, I am convinced that it is
state Islam, as practiced in the Arab countries today, that serves to amplify rather than create political and cultural oppression. The real problem with Islam is not actually Islam; it is how Islam is practiced in Arab lands.
Saudi Arabia is a paradigm. According to Prof. Fouad Ajami of The Johns Hopkins University, Islam has been "the handmaiden of the state" since the beginning of the modern Saudi realm, resluting from "an alliance between a desert chieftan, Muhammed bin Saud, and a religious reformer named Muhammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab. This partnership anchored the kingdom. The House of Saud defended the country and struck bargains with world powers, while the descendants of the Wahhab family dominated the judiciary and an educational system suffused with religion.
The real enemy of Western civilization today is not Islam. It is arabism: a system of political and social authoritarianism in Arab lands using Islam as a handmaiden, as Prof. Ajami put it. (Remember, most Muslims are not Arabs.)
Our task is therefore over the long term to bring home to these nations, at every level of their societies, the fact that Japan had to face: the times, they are a-changing. These nations must come to realize at every level that they cannot successfully continue with business as before. They must transition into democratically based insitutions with free-market systems and individual freedoms. The question is, can these reforms be brought about non-violently, with lesser violence, or do they require profound suffering by their peoples?
Let me polish my crystal ball:
The US will not target enemy populations. The possibility that the USA will launch deliberate, highly destructive strikes against mostly civilian areas of the countries of the Axis of Evil is non-existent. The deliberate targeting of civilians by our enemies has been the source of American condemnation of al Qaeda and its supporters. Killing civilians as an end in itself is what the American and European governments have most strongly condemned. The Palestinian murder-suicide bombers have been condemned in the strongest terms by the US government. So B-52 arc lights through downtown Baghdad are not in the cards.
Before taking direct action against Iraq, we need to clearly define what we desire the end state to be. That is, when the day comes when Iraq is no longer of national-security concern to the United States, what will Iraq be like?
U.S. national objectives are implicit in the Bush administration's pronouncements to date. They seem to be:
the destruction of Iraq's capability to use nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, or further to develop them,
ending Iraq's capability to launch conventional attacks beyond its borders
the final end of Saddam's regime.
the emplacement of a democratic, constitutional government in Baghdad.
Accomplishing anything short of these will not solve the problem, and will leave soil from which future confrontations will grow. We should not make the mistake of ridding Iraq of Saddam, only for him to be replaced with another despot who simply seems benign toward the United States. I think that democracy can be inculcated in Iraq, but not easily; Iraq has no democratic history. The American people need to understand that the democratization of Iraq will be a long-term commitment.
Saddam must die or be captured. The destruction of Saddam's regime must include the death or capture of Saddam himself. Even if he is rendered politically and militarily impotent, he will not be seen as defeated unless he is dead or in custody. No exile should be allowed. Personally, I think a Nuremberg-style trial would serve our interests well and enable the Iraqi people to learn the murderousness of the regime.
I think the odds are great the the Iraqi regular military will defect or stack arms as soon as US forces appear. But the Republican Guard must be destroyed and completely wrecked as an operating entity. That means that all of its units will either have to die or be surrendered to the US armed forces. We must not permit soil to remain from which may grow the claim that Iraq was not truly beaten. America must not simply be victorious; our victory must be blindingly obvious to the Baathist hardcore and other nations. Like the Japanese, only when the Iraqi people know that there is no alternative to liberalization and democracy can it occur.